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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiff does not dispute defendant's statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE BELOW 
Plaintiff does not dispute defendant's statement. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
UTAH DIVORCE COURTS MUST RETAIN BROAD, EQUITABLE POWERS 
TO ALLOCATE THE BENEFITS AND SUCCESSES AS WELL AS THE 
DEBTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE MARRIAGE. DUE PROCESS 
REQUIRES CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS THAT ARE FLEXIBLE 
TO ACHIEVE FAIRNESS. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS* REMEDY OF "EQUITABLE 
RESTITUTION" IS A SOUND AND CREATIVE REFINEMENT TO 
FASHION AN EQUITABLE RESULT WHERE A MAJOR INVESTMENT IN 
HUMAN CAPITAL BY BOTH PARTIES HAS RESULTED IN A 
POTENTIAL FOR SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED EARNINGS FOR ONE 
PARTY BUT NO BENEFIT, UNDER A TRADITIONAL ASSET 
DISTRIBUTION, TO THE OTHER PARTY. 
POINT III 
BY ALLOCATING THE "EQUITABLE RESTITUTION" FIRST AND 
THEN THE ALIMONY (IF ANY) AND CHILD SUPPORT, THE TRIAL 
COURT CAN EASILY ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE RESULT. 
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POINT IV 
SINCE THE EVIDENCE USED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TO 
AWARD INCREASED ALIMONY, INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT, AND 
EQUITABLE RESTITUTION WAS ALL PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL, THE APPEALS COURT DECISION SHOULD BE MADE 
RETROACTIVE TO THE TIME OF TRIAL TO AVOID THE HARSH 
RESULT OF PLAINTIFF HAVING LIVED WITH INADEQUATE 
AMOUNTS FOR THE THREE YEARS OF THE APPEALS PROCESS. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF HAVING CARRIED A SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL BURDEN 
IN BRINGING A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE LAW TO RESOLVE 
INEQUITITIES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT, SHE SHOULD BE 
AWARDED A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD HER COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN C. MARTINEZ, 
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JESS M. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
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1 Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF PARTIES AND TERMS 
In the interest of brevity and precision the following 
shorthand terms will be utilized in lieu of the bulkier, yet more 
precise definitions. 
A. PLAINTIFF: In this action Karen C. Martinez was 
plaintiff at the trial, appellant during the appeal at the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and is presently respondent on certiorari 
before this court. 
B. DEFENDANT: Jess M. Martinez was defendant at the trial, 
respondent on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, and petitioner 
on certiorari before this court. 
C. HUMAN CAPITAL: The term utilized by economists to 
describe the decision by rational persons to forego current 
income or benefits in order to invest in training, education or 
other intellectual improvement which will significantly increase 
potential earnings to the individual or individuals in which the 
investment has been made. The term reflects the similarity in 
thought processes associated with decisions made to invest in 
tangible capital goods and in intellectual capital, both of which 
lead to increased future income, which is the measure of the 
increased productivity and the return on the investment. At the 
trial on this matter plaintiff's expert witness provided 
uncontroverted testimony that this concept was generally accepted 
within the field of economics and that the concept was so well 
accepted that it had evolved into a major subdiscipline within 
the field. (Trial Transcript page 79 lines 5-13, hereinafter 
"TT 79, 5-13"; TT 85, 11-23; TT 86, 10-22.) 
D. BENEFITTED SPOUSE: That spouse upon whom the 
education, training or license has been conferred as a result of 
a marital decision to defer current consumption in order to 
invest in "HUMAN CAPITAL" with the intention that the family will 
enjoy a substantially increased future standard of living as a 
result of the increased earning power vested in that spouse as a 
result of that investment. 
E. CONTRIBUTING SPOUSE: The husband or wife of the 
BENEFITTED SPOUSE who has contributed to the Human Capital 
investment effort by sacrificing his or her current standard of 
living in return for the prospect of a higher family standard of 
living in the future. These contributions can be direct 
financial contributions, where that spouse's income actually 
defers some or all of the actual costs of schooling or other 
training. However, such contributions are more likely to be 
indirect, in the form of a reduced standard of living during the 
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investment phase, the carrying of a disproportionate share of the 
family responsibilities during the investment phase, or perhaps 
foregoing career enhancement opportunities, all for the purpose 
of facilitating the investment in the benefitted spouse. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Due to the significant misstatements of fact in defendant's 
brief, plaintiff accepts that statement only to the extent that 
defendant's statement of fact is not corrected hereunder. Of 
the misstatements, those deemed relevant to the issues before the 
court are corrected as follows: 
A. MARITAL HISTORY: Plaintiff accepts defendant's 
statement of the marital history with the following exceptions: 
The parties never moved to Hill Air Force Base. Defendant was 
employed at Hill Air Force Base during the second year of the 
parties1 marriage and earned between $8,000 and $9,000 that year. 
(TT 5.) From 1968 through 1977 plaintiff was employed for the 
first one and one-half years until the parties moved to Germany. 
(TT 29, 5-13.) In addition, she bore all three of the parties1 
children during that period, Brent on October 1, 1970, Ryan on 
August 31, 1971 and Heather on May 29, 1975. Plaintiff began 
working again when defendant went to college and worked six more 
years including through defendant's medical school. (TT 34, 13-
19.) 
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In his presentation of income figures on his chart, 
defendant conveniently omits the three years of medical school 
during which time he was not employed other than in the 
educational investment undertaken in pursuit of his anticipated 
profession. (Defendant/Petitioner's brief page 4, hereinafter 
f,D/P B 4".) Plaintiff worked outside of the home for all three 
of those years, although her earning capacity was admittedly 
limited by the three small children. She worked as a hostess, 
waitress and in other positions for which income is generally 
meager, but for which the hours of employment were suitable to 
her requirement to care for the three children during the day-
time hours while defendant was engaged in his schooling efforts. 
(TT 34, 13-19.) 
Defendant's statement in his brief that "plaintiff did not 
work except in 1978, 1979 and 1980 when she was employed as a 
part-time waitress" (D/P B 5) ignores two of the years that she 
worked outside the home, unfairly ignores all of the support 
functions provided by plaintiff during the educational process, 
and ignores the limitations placed on her employment 
opportunities by defendant after the parties moved to 
Pennsylvania. Defendant moved the family to an isolated farm 
house at first where no work was available (TT 36, 2-8) and 
after he moved them to a bigger city, he told her she could not 
work at Burger King (TT 37, 2-4) or at Gysinger Clinic (TT 37, 
14-15). Her diligent efforts to find work elsewhere were futile 
(TT 7, 16-23; 36, 14-24.) Defendant also ignores the sacrifices 
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made by plaintiff and the children during the fifteen years of 
education and he attempts to limit the court's attention strictly 
to the outside earnings of the parties during the marriage. 
Plaintiff does not attempt to place any inordinate value on 
her meager earnings during the marriage, nor has she done so 
throughout any of the prior proceedings on this matter. However, 
the record is clear and documented by the findings of the trial 
court that she provided substantial non-monetary support 
necessary for defendant to complete the educational and training 
process, and that she and the children made significant 
sacrifices in their standard of living during that fifteen year 
process which would not have been necessary had defendant 
directed all of his efforts toward the family's then-current 
standard of living. Defendant's statement that "He also saved 
money which was then used to support the family during the last 
three years of medical school" (D/P B 5) chauvinistically implies 
that plaintiff and the children made no sacrifices to facilitate 
those savings. 
Similarly, throughout his brief, defendant alleges that he 
decided to obtain the college education, he decided to undertake 
medical school and he incurred the student loans . . . all in 
total disregard of the sacrifices made by plaintiff and the 
children. At the trial and throughout these proceedings, 
plaintiff acknowledged her reluctance to continue the significant 
sacrifices that were required of her and the children in order to 
continue the educational process. However, the marriage did not 
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break up at that time because plaintiff did continue the 
sacrifices necessary to support the HUMAN CAPITAL investment. 
(TT 33, 13-21.) In his statement of facts, defendant totally 
ignores the tremendous emotional price paid by plaintiff during 
the internship and residency when the family was required to live 
in a small and primitive shack in the rural Pennsylvania 
countryside with no telephone, no means of transportation, and no 
adult association (TT 36, 2-4) nor the stress associated with her 
having total responsibility for the children on the minimal 
budget upon which the family subsisted during that training while 
the defendant was "working an exorbitant number of hours11 and on 
call 36 hours at a time. (TT 19, 6-11.) 
B. BREAKUP OF THE MARRIAGE: Defendant's statement of facts 
as to how the marriage broke up omits several relevant factors 
and seriously misstates others. Plaintiff did object to the move 
to Pennsylvania at the outset, as stated by defendant. However, 
the court should keep in mind the primitive and isolated 
facilities to which plaintiff and the children were subjected 
while defendant performed his internship. (TT 36, 2-4.) The 
stress of this sacrifice was much less on defendant who was gone 
for days at a time and who had numerous outside challenges and 
associations at the hospital during this period. (TT 19, 6-12.) 
Defendant's statement of why plaintiff left Pennsylvania is 
grossly misleading. The actual facts of that separation are 
that defendant had been involved in an affair with another woman. 
When plaintiff found a love letter from the girlfriend and 
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confronted defendant with the same, he told her that he would not 
give up the girl friend, that he would not take part in any 
marriage counseling, nor would he attempt to save the marriage. 
(TT 20, 1-17; 18, 25 to 19, 5; 21, 2-3.) Under those 
circumstances plaintiff and the children returned to Utah and 
obtained a job within one week. Both parties still thought the 
defendant would follow and practice in Utah. (TT 21, 4-6.) 
Under the circumstances, to claim that she left defendant because 
of the area and the lack of comfort is absurd. It was plaintiff 
who was granted the divorce from defendant on the grounds of 
mental cruelty due to defendant's "consorting with an adult 
female other than plaintiff." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, Record 204, hereinafter f,R 204".) The court made no 
finding of desertion or mental cruelty on plaintiff's part. 
C. RESIDENT TRAINING: He was eight or nine months into 
performing his residency training in emergency medicine in 
Pennsylvania at the time that plaintiff and the children returned 
to Utah. (TT 17, 16-18.) 
D. DEFENDANT'S INCOME: Defendant's statement of his income 
and expenses implies that he incurred over $1,200 per month, or 
approximately $15,000 per year for professionally required 
expenditures such as malpractice insurance. This is a gross 
misrepresentation of the evidence which was adduced at trial 
which reflected a gross income of $8,333 per month and a total 
annual expenditure for business required expenses such as 
malpractice insurance of $7,100, or less than $600 per month. 
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(TT 9-12.) Defendant also states that there was "nothing left in 
the tax account after April 15th of each year". (D/P B 7.) In 
actuality, defendant had not paid any taxes on his $100,000.00 
per year income under the employment contract in effect at the 
time of trial, but testified that he was putting that much into a 
tax account in anticipation of the tax payment, based upon the 
then current maximum tax rate of 50%. (TT 102, 15-22.) 
E. LIVING EXPENSES: Defendant's statement as to his living 
expenses at the time of trial, while technically correct, implies 
that he was paying a substantial sum toward his student loans and 
thereby had monthly expenses of $4,337. (Defendant's exhibit 3, R 
223.) In actuality, the amount of his payment toward school 
loans at the time of trial was minimal. What he claimed for his 
personal living expenses, excluding the temporary support paid to 
plaintiff under the temporary order was nearly twice plaintiff's 
total expenditures for herself and the children based on the 
temporary support and her limited income. (Plaintiff's exhibit 
F, R 222.) After the trial the parties1 second child, Ryan, 
returned to Pennsylvania to live with defendant, and the trial 
court reduced the total child support payable to plaintiff by 
$100 per month as a result of that change. (Hearing Transcript 
8/29/85, R 200.) 
F. ADEQUACY OF EVIDENCE: Further in his argument defendant 
contends that "Mrs. Martinez failed to present adequate evidence 
to support a finding that a medical degree was a marital asset;" 
(D/P B 12, paragraph 2). In actuality, plaintiff qualified two 
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eminent experts Dr. Chris Lewis, Chairman of the Department of 
Economics at Utah State University (TT 77, 21-22) and David 
Dorton, CFA, a business and financial analyst (TT 61 and 62). 
Both experts testified that the medical degree and license to 
practice medicine were intangible property acquired as a result 
of the parties1 investment in human capital which conferred a 
greatly increased income potential upon defendant. (TT 82-87 and 
TT 63-71.) Defendant presented no expert testimony and the 
testimony of plaintiff's two experts was neither controverted nor 
undermined on cross-examination. Plaintiff's expert further 
testified that the value of the human capital bestowed upon 
defendant was quantifiable utilizing techniques accepted 
throughout the economic community. (TT 79, 5-11.) Using 
conservative factors, the witnesses testified that the asset was 
worth between 1.6 million and 1.9 million dollars. (TT 71 and 
82-84.) The difference in valuation was explained by Dr. Lewis 
at the trial to arise from the different figures utilized by the 
witnesses in determining defendant's net income from the practice 
(excluding fixed business expenditures). Mr. Dorton, who 
testified first, based his calculations upon answers to earlier 
interrogatories wherein Dr. Martinez estimated his expenditures 
to be $10,000 per year. After defendant's testimony at trial, 
Dr. Lewis recalculated his evaluation based upon a total cost of 
doing business of $7,100 per year. (TT 83, 21-25 and 84, 1-7.) 
The difference in net income before taxes accounts for the 
$100,000 difference in valuation for defendant's expected work 
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life, discounted to its then present value utilizing conservative 
discount factors. (TT 80-82 and 91.) This value is not the 
value of defendant's total income during his life expectancy. It 
is the value of the additional income attributable to the 
education and training received during the marriage, and was 
calculated by deducting the average income for a high school 
graduate of the same age from defendant's current and projected 
income (TT 83, 15-20). (The average income for a high school 
graduate utilized, from U.S. Government tables, was $33,600 per 
year, (TT 83, 2-4) which is much higher than defendant's actual 
pre-education income level of $8,000 to $9,000 per year, and 
reflects the conservative nature of the calculations used by the 
experts. (See Mr. Dorton's testimony TT 63 through 71 and Dr. 
Lewis' testimony TT 79 through 86.) 
G. EQUITABLE RESTITUTION: Defendant's statement (D/P B 12) 
that neither party had raised, argued or urged the creation of 
the doctrine of equitable restitution is technically correct. 
However, from the time that plaintiff filed her amended complaint 
in this matter (R 4) through the interrogatory process, (R 59-62) 
and through the trial itself, plaintiff clearly requested from 
the court a share of the greatly increased income expectancy 
vested in defendant during the marriage. (R 127-144, Plaintiff's 
Trial Brief; TT 66 line 21 through 68 line 6; TT 113-124.) The 
term equitable restitution was originated by the Court of 
Appeals in an attempt to solve the equitable dilemmas faced by 
courts across the country in dealing with cases such as this one. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
In an action for divorce the court has broad equity powers 
to allocate the benefits and successes as well as the debts and 
liabilities resulting from the joint actions of the family unit 
prior to the breakup of the principal partners. The discretion 
associated with this power is essential to the due process 
function and should not be restricted nor distorted by unduly 
restrictive historical definitions and categories which have 
evolved over the years to expedite judicial processing of divorce 
cases. 
POINT II 
The remedy of "equitable restitution" fashioned by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in this case is a sound and creative refinement 
of the court's equity powers to identify and allocate the 
deferred returns from a marital investment in human capital which 
bestows on one of the partners a potential for substantially 
increased future earnings. 
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POINT III 
In order to deal equitably with the allocation of intangible 
marital assets the court may need to reorder the sequence in 
which divorce issues are resolved. 
POINT IV 
I n t h e i n t e r e s t of e q u i t y , t h i s c o u r t s h o u l d d i r e c t t h a t t h e 
f i n a l r e m e d y f a s h i o n e d on a p p e a l t o c o r r e c t t h e h a r s h l y 
i n e q u i t a b l e Dec ree of D i v o r c e e n t e r e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d 
be made r e t r o a c t i v e t o May 3 1 , 1985, t h e d a t e of t r i a l . 
POINT V 
P l a i n t i f f h a s c l e a r l y c a r r i e d a s u b s t a n t i a l b u r d e n of 
b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n e c e s s a r y c h a n g e i n t h e l a w of t h i s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n i n o r d e r t o r e s o l v e t h e i n e q u i t i e s imposed upon h e r 
by t h e t r i a l c o u r t and s h o u l d t h u s be awarded a s u b s t a n t i a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n t c o s t s a n d a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s 
i n c u r r e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l and a p p e l l a t e p r o c e s s . 
ARGUMENT 
In order to avoid substantial redundancy in the material 
presented to this court, plaintiff refers the court to Point I of 
her appellant's brief filed in January, 1986. That brief 
contains a thorough analysis of the case law up to the time that 
the brief was filed. Only more recent cases are included in this 
brief. It is clear that the courts of the various states have 
experienced considerable difficulty in dealing with the 
allocation of deferred returns from joint marital investments in 
human capital which bestow upon one of the partners a 
substantially increased future earning potential. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has made commendable progress in this area by creating 
the remedy of equitable restitution. 
POINT I 
IN AN ACTION FOR DIVORCE THE COURT HAS BROAD EQUITY POWERS 
TO ALLOCATE THE BENEFITS AND SUCCESSES AS WELL AS THE DEBTS AND 
LIABILITIES RESULTING FROM THE JOINT ACTIONS OF THE FAMILY UNIT 
PRIOR TO THE BREAKUP OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTNERS. THE DISCRETION 
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS POWER IS ESSENTIAL TO THE DUE PROCESS 
FUNCTION AND SHOULD NOT BE RESTRICTED NOR DISTORTED BY UNDULY 
RESTRICTIVE HISTORICAL DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES WHICH HAVE 
EVOLVED OVER THE YEARS TO EXPEDITE JUDICIAL PROCESSING OF DIVORCE 
CASES. 
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The legal systems of this country and the State of Utah 
inherently provide structure and predictability to the 
interactions between our citizens while retaining the flexibility 
to adapt to the social evolution of society. Some changes, such 
as those in the area of women's suffrage and civil rights have 
been major and highly publicized corrections involving 
legislation and significant public input. Others, such as in 
the field of equity, are more subtle and are carried out within 
the court system without mass public participation. The latter 
is clearly the case as the courts across the country attempt to 
deal with the distribution of the less tangible assets which have 
been jointly acquired by the partners to a now bankrupt 
marriage. As set forth in plaintiff's earlier brief, some courts 
have attempted to classify these expectations of increased income 
or intangible assets as "property" in order to fashion a means by 
which both marital partners can share in the returns to the 
investment. As defendant points out in his brief, there has been 
significant resistance to categorizing such intangibles as 
property as a result of their lack of transferability and other 
historic attributes of property. Typical of that resistance, the 
Colorado Supreme Court, in the Graham case (In Re Marriage of 
Graham, 574 P. 2d 75 [Colo. 1978]) stated that the educational 
degree at issue therein did not . . . 
have an exchange value or any objective 
transferrable value on an open market. It is personal 
to the holder. It terminates on the death of the 
holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, 
sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged. Ld. at 77. 
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While the Colorado Court recognized that the educational 
degree requires a substantial investment of study time and effort 
by the benefitted spouse, they totally ignored the additional 
effort, support and sacrifices made by the contributing spouse. 
Having done that, the court dismissed the value of the increased 
income potential conferred upon the benefitted spouse, and 
denied Mrs. Graham what the trial court had originally awarded 
her as a share of the discounted value of this flow of increased 
future earnings. (.Id. at 77.) The court totally ignored the 
investment decisions that had lead to the undertaking, and the 
joint nature of the effort and sacrifices made by both partners 
to bring about the resultant return on the investment. 
Many of the states which refused to characterize such 
increased future earnings as property have attempted to reach an 
equitable result by "reimbursing" the contributing spouse for her 
efforts and sacrifices through an award of alimony based upon 
the increased earnings of the benefitted spouse. (See 
plaintiff's original brief, Issue number 1.) In order to avoid 
the unfairness of such an allocation, (wherein the contributing 
spouse's share of the joint investment in human capital is 
terminated by the non-related event of her remarriage) some of 
the states have attempted to make all or part of the contributing 
spouse's alimony non-terminable by his or her remarriage. As 
Judge Orme point out in the Appeals Court decision in the case at 
bar, to award the contributing spouse regular alimony, terminable 
upon remarriage, is to "force her to forego marriage and perhaps 
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even be celibate for many years simply to realize a return on her 
investments and sacrifices . . . ." Martinez v. Martinez, 754 
P.2d 69 at 77, fn 9 (Utah App. 1988) citing Hubbard v. Hubbard, 
603 P.2d 747 at 752 (Okla. 1979). The glaring inequity of this 
terminable alimony approach is further highlighted by the fact 
that after the remarriage of the contributing spouse, the 
benefitted spouse now receives the ent ire return on the 
investment which was made by both marital partners and the 
resulting standards of living are very unequal. See citations on 
original brief. 
The non terminable alimony approach was alluded to by Judge 
Orme in footnote 4 of the opinion in Peterson v. Peterson, 737 
P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987) at page 242 wherein he stated 
In another kind of recurring case, typified by 
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the degree 
is obtained, traditional alimony analysis would often 
work hardship because, while both spouses have modest 
incomes at the time of divorce, the one is on the 
threshold of a significant increase in earnings. 
Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so the other could 
attain a degree is precluded from enjoying the 
anticipated dividends the degree will ordinarily 
provide. Nonetheless, such a spouse is typically not 
remote in time from his or her previous education and 
is otherwise better able to adjust and to acquire 
comparable skills, given the opportunity and the 
funding. In such cases, alimony analysis must become 
more creative to achieve fairness, and an award of 
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement11 alimony, not 
terminable upon remarriage, may be appropriate. See, 
e.g. , Hauqan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 
(1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 
(1982). 
The approach suggested by Judge Orme is consistent with the 
position taken by plaintiff in her original (appellant's) brief 
to this court. At that time plaintiff came to the conclusion 
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that, under the then-existing tax laws, the non-terminable 
alimony approach was the only way to equitably allocate the 
benefits from the investment in human capital. The primary basis 
for such a position was that by making the payment alimony, the 
speculative nature of the future income would be eliminated, with 
both parties receiving their shares of the "return" as it was 
actually earned. In addition, the tax attributable to the 
portion of the income transferred to the contributing spouse 
would be shifted to her as she received the payment. If the 
transfer had been treated as a transfer of a property asset, the 
payment would have to have been made by the benefitted spouse 
from "after tax dollars" thereby placing the entire income 
package in the highest possible income tax bracket, and shifting 
to the benefitted spouse an unreasonable tax burden which he or 
she might not have been able mitigate through tax shelters. 
With the change in the taxability of transfers between 
parties to a divorce brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
the court now has the power to allocate the tax incidence of 
transfer payments made pursuant to a divorce action in order to 
achieve equity in the distribution. As a result, the need to 
term the transfer "alimony" in order to reach equity from the tax 
angle is no longer existent, and the allocation can be dealt with 
directly and without confusing normal alimony principles. T h e 
courts of this country have historically experienced very little 
difficulty in valuing and allocating tangible property assets, 
including capital assets, acquired during a marriage. In those 
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cases the courts do not limit their valuation to the mere 
depreciated value of the capital property assets of the family 
business, but value the business based upon its overall future 
income expectancy arising from that asset and other factors such 
as goodwill. 
The courts have also been able to allocate assets which are 
primarily intangible, but have both tangible and intangible 
characteristics. The example used in plaintiff's initial brief 
was a McDonald's franchise. Although the investors might well 
pay $500,000 to open a McDonald's franchise, less than half that 
value would be attributed to tangible property assets, with the 
remainder of the value attributable to goodwill and sales 
promotions performed nationwide for the purpose of developing and 
maintaining future income for all franchisees. The courts have 
no problem valuing that franchise at the time of a divorce, and 
the value placed on the asset at that time would not be limited 
to the actual cash inputs by each of the partners. The value 
would include the assets, the national goodwill that comes with 
the franchise and the local goodwill attributable to the 
successful operation of the store at issue, and reflected in the 
income expectancy projections utilized by the valuation experts. 
The most difficult assets for the courts to allocate have 
been those which are entirely intangible, with none of the "hands 
on" characteristics of tangible property. These assets generally 
have a value far in excess of the token value of any property or 
certificate associated with the asset, and often contain elements 
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of speculation and other uncertainties as to future payouts. The 
assets are admittedly more difficult to value, but at trial both 
of plaintifffs expert witnesses testified, without contradiction, 
that such valuations are possible and are accepted by the 
business and economic community. (TT 63-65 and TT 79-88). Other 
courts have concluded that such valuation and equitable 
distribution is not only possible but required. In addition to 
cases cited in original brief, see In re Marriage of Smith, 518 
N.E.2d 450 at 457 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1987) where the Illinois 
court held that 
"(A) contributing spouse is entitled to some form of 
compensation for financial efforts and support provided 
to the student spouse in the expectation that the 
marital unit would prosper in the future as a direct 
result of the couple's previous sacrifices." 
The New York Supreme Court continues to hold that one 
partes academic degree acquired during a marriage is marital 
property subject to equitable distribution reasoning that just as 
"a non-vested pension is an asset subject to equitable 
distribution on divorce . . . . (s)o it should also be 
with professional licenses and academic degrees. 
Otherwise, with the simple stroke of serving a summons 
immediately prior to graduation day, a spouse 
contemplating divorce could prevent a spouse who 
assisted in his or her spouses (sic) attaining such a 
degree or license from receiving that which he or she 
is entitled to . . . . Freyer v. Freyer, 524 N.Y.S.2d 
197 149 (Sup. 1987). 
Likewise, the Michigan Court of Appeals continues to hold 
that, following its Woodworth decision (cited in plaintiff's 
original brief) a professional degree should be valued and 
equitably divided either in the property settlement or as 
alimony. Daniels v. Daniels, 418 N.W.2d 924 at 927 (Mich. App. 
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1988). See also Thomas v. Thomas, 417 N.W.2d 563 at 566 (Mich. 
App. 1987) where the contributing spouse was awarded one-eighth 
of the value of the student spouse's law degree, based on a 
valuation using information known at the time of trial, the 
contributing spouse having also received all equity in the 
parties1 home and the bulk of other martial assets. 
In Greer v. Greer, 353 S.E.2d 427 at 431 (N.C. App. 1987) 
the North Carolina Court found that the husband who sacrificed so 
his wife could obtain her medical degree was entitled to 
compensation. Under the North Carolina statute, professional 
licenses are separate property. However, the statutory factors 
used to determine an equitable result include "direct or indirect 
contributions made by one spouse to help educate or develop the 
career potential of the other spouse." The court specifically 
considered the contributing spouse's greater role in child care 
and homemaking duties in making the award. In addition to 
affirming that the contributing spouse deserved a cash award for 
the value of his contribution, the court affirmed the trial court 
awarding him the family home, despite the fact that he was not 
the custodial parent, to make the property distribution 
equitable. 
As with the goodwill of the McDonald's franchise, the value 
of these intangible assets is a direct function of the future 
flow of income attributed to the asset. These valuation problems 
have generally been overcome by the courts in dealing with 
expected retirement benefits as was the case in Woodward v. 
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Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). As set forth in Woodward, 
the problems with speculation as to the duration of future 
retirement payouts and the amount of such payouts can be 
overcome by a structured payout of the benefits as they are 
received by the marital partner on whom the intangible asset was 
vested. In essence, the Woodward case tells us that the non-
pensioned (contributing) spouse is entitled to one-half of the 
value of the pension which accrued to the pensioned (benefitted) 
spouse during the course of the marriage. In those cases it is 
clear that the contributing spouse (non-pensioned spouse) should 
receive one-half of the retirement payment as it is received, ij: 
the retirement benefit accrued entirely during the time that the 
parties were married, and if the court does not elect to place a 
present value on the pension benefits and offset it with other 
property accrued during the marriage partnership. 
The courts have had the most difficultly in dealing with 
valuation and distribution of human capital acquired during a 
marriage and conferred entirely upon one of the spouses. In 
essence, the marital effort is a partnership undertaking wherein 
there is a significant shift of the marital resources to support 
the investment in the education and training of the benefitted 
spouse, to include a significant shift in the allocation of 
domestic duties, such as care for the home and children, to the 
contributing spouse. The contributing spouse is also called upon 
for direct contributions to the financial support of the family 
during the education of the benefitted spouse. Clearly, the 
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problem is that the asset acquired as a result of this investment 
is in the brain of the benefitted spouse. That being the case, 
it is impossible for the court to reach out and touch the asset 
and perhaps somehow divide portions of the brain between the 
parties. 
Investment decisions involving such tangible assets as 
retirements are not always clear even to the participating 
parties. But, even in those cases the parties have often forgone 
a different job with higher current wages or perhaps lived in a 
less desirable location in order to secure the deferred benefit. 
Closer analysis of the process shows, however, that the 
investment decisions made by the parties in the human capital 
market are exactly the same as if the investment had been made in 
a machine for a family business. (TT 85, 11-23; 86, 7-22.) 
Defendant urges this court to take the narrow view of 
"property", ignoring the economically accepted concept of Human 
Capital and the sacrifices by both parties involved in the 
investment process to obtain the medical degree, license and 
specialization. Such a narrow approach would merely perpetuate 
past inequities arising from problems which the courts have had 
in grasping these relatively complex economic concepts. Whether 
saleable or not, the asset is the result of the joint investment 
and acquired as a result of the conscious decisions by the 
partners to make current sacrifices during the investment phase 
of the process in order to reap the expected future benefits. 
The fact that these benefits take the form of an increased flow 
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of income which vests in the brain of the benefitted party does 
not change the reality of the decision process. The essence of 
that decision is that the parties defer current income, 
expenditures and standard of living in order to bring about the 
expec tat i on of substantially increased future income, 
expenditures and standard of living from the returns to that 
investment. As with the case of capital machinery, the 
investment decision is not made unless the expected return is 
high enough to make the current sacrifices worthwhile. In this 
case, if the expected income level as a result of the investment 
in human capital is not high enough to justify the sacrifices and 
reduction in current standard of living, then the rational, 
economically-oriented decision-maker will not undertake the 
investment. In the case of Dr. Martinez, the expectation was to 
raise the family income from the $8,000 to $9,000 per year level 
prior to his entry into the educational process to a level of 
$100,000 or more per year, as was reflected by his current 
contract at the time of trial. 
The 1987 Colorado case cited by defendant recognized the 
inequity in the Graham decision, supra. The Colorado Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 
(Colo. 1987), because its holding in Graham that an advanced 
degree is not marital property brought a "harsh and often unfair 
outcome" for the contributing spouse. The court recognized that 
the "deferral of earning capacity . . . at the expense of the 
current standard of living of the couple" is made with "an 
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expectation of a higher standard of living in the future." The 
contributing spouse, when the divorce comes before the fruits of 
the joint investment are realized, "is left without the 
resources to recover from the years of deferring the acquisition 
of property and security." Recognizing that the "potential for 
injustice" is great, the Colorado Court re-examined the issue. 
Id at 678. The Court took what was for Colorado a big step 
toward equity by redefining the statutory "threshold of need" 
required before awarding maintenance. The Court held that, 
rather than base a maintenance award on whether the requesting 
spouse can meet his or her own "minimum requirements to sustain 
life", the standard in the past, the courts should consider all 
circumstances including "reasonable needs" and whether 
"appropriate employment" can be found considering the 
contributing spouse's "reasonable expectations established during 
the marriage." Thus, the Court loosened its alimony analysis to 
reach a more fair result. Xd. at 681. An unusually harsh court, 
the Colorado Court did not decide until 1987 that a pension plan 
is marital property. In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P. 2d 661 at 
664 (Colo. 1987). 
In his brief, defendant makes a point of the educational 
debts which remain after the educational process, which he has 
been ordered to pay. Although the amount of this debt is greatly 
exaggerated by defendant and is almost negligible compared to the 
value of the education and training, plaintiff does not claim 
that she should receive a share of the value of the Human Capital 
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without consideration for the debt. If the partnership had not 
been dissolved by divorce the benefit which she and the children 
would have received would have been on a net basis after the 
payment of debts and costs of doing business, such as Mai-
Practice Insurance. That is why these items were excluded from 
the valuation formula utilized by the expert witnesses. Taxes 
were dealt with separately and would be either included or 
excluded depending on whether the value payable to plaintiff 
would be from before-tax or after-tax dollars. 
Finally, one of the arguments made against allocating the 
returns to the Human Capital investment which become a part of 
the brain of the benefitted spouse is that there are no returns 
unless that benefitted spouse expends his or her effort to bring 
about the increased income. Again, plaintiff does not claim an 
interest in defendants basic earnings after the divorce, except 
as those earnings would be applicable to the classic alimony 
analysis. If the court will review the manner in which 
plaintiff's expert witnesses calculated the value of the 
investment asset at the time of trial, it will readily recognize 
that both experts "netted out" the effect of defendant's hourly 
earnings by deducting from that valuation process the average 
earnings of defendant's high school graduate contemporaries. 
Since defendant's contract at the time of trial did not provide 
for any "overtime" requirements, it must be assumed that the 
earnings which he would receive under that contract would be for 
a work week that would be comparable to that put in by his high 
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school graduate contemporaries. That being the case, the 
difference between the average high school graduate earnings for 
a forty hour week and the earnings for a doctor in defendant's 
position for a forty hour week would be the amount attributable 
to the return on the Human Capital investment made by the marital 
partners. Again, plaintiff would not require that defendant work 
eighty hour weeks in order to provide her with a share of the 
"overtime" income, but only requests an equal share of the return 
on the investment made during the marital partnership. 
As set forth in the uncontradicted testimony by plaintiff!s 
witnesses, the asset which plaintiff requests be divided is 
identifiable, quantifiable, and allocable in the interest of 
equity. Plaintiff should not be denied her share of the 
partnership investment merely because the returns to that 
investment do not fit neatly into the package that has been 
historically titled "property" by the courts in order to expedite 
administrative handling of cases. 
POINT II 
THE REMEDY OF "EQUITABLE RESTITUTION" FASHIONED BY THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE IS A SOUND AND CREATIVE REFINEMENT 
OF THE COURT'S EQUITY POWERS TO IDENTIFY AND ALLOCATE THE 
DEFERRED RETURNS FROM A MARITAL INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL WHICH 
BESTOWS ON ONE OF THE PARTNERS A POTENTIAL FOR SUBSTANTIALLY 
INCREASED FUTURE EARNINGS. 
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The court has broad powers in equity to allocate fairness, 
not necessarily only property as that term has been developed 
throughout the years in the court system. For instance, in 
Peterson v. Peterson, 748 P.2d 593 at 596 (Utah App. 1988), the 
court awarded the wife the husband's premarital home for the 
benefit of the children to help ameliorate the emotional trauma 
of divorce contrary to the general rule that premarital property 
is separate. In Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 at 1373 (Utah 
1988) the court also gave premarital assets to the non-acquiring 
spouse to achieve "a fair, just and equitable result between the 
parties.,f 
The rules in equity allow more attention to the specific 
facts of each case, and grant the court far greater discretion in 
determining fairness under the particular circumstances of that 
case. During the marital dissolution process the court is forced 
to deal with an exceptional range of issues that result from the 
marital partnership and should not be precluded from allocating 
the benefits of investment in Human Capital and other intangibles 
merely because those assets do not fit into any preconceived 
definitions of property or include characteristics which have 
been expected of tangible personal property which has been 
allocated in previous cases. This court specified that "all 
assets" and income and circumstances should be considered for an 
equitable result, including "potential earning capacity." 
Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1978). While plaintiff 
acknowledges the need for categorizations and definitions to 
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facilitate the administrative processing of cases, the form 
provided by that structure should not supersede the fairness 
demanded by due process. Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion 
in Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d 304 at 310 (Utah 1988) 
expresses this fairness policy. Although there are general rules 
in dividing assets of a marriage, these can be ignored "in the 
greater interest in a just and equitable decree." In Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 at 1081 (Utah 1988) Justice Stewart states 
that in cases such as the one at bar where the assets are meager 
when the divorce occurs soon after graduation, the court must 
look at ways other than the typical division of assets and award 
of alimony because "equity and fairness required another 
solution" to "equalize the parties1 respective standards of 
living . . . " The Court in Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 
at 242 (Utah App. 1987) recognized the need for a more creative 
remedy in cases such as this one, reaffirmed in Rayburn v. 
Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987). 
In setting forth the remedy of "equitable restitution" the 
Court of Appeals recognized that the parties had made a conscious 
investment decision in the Human Capital which was ultimately 
manifested in defendant's greatly increased earning power. The 
court also recognized that the "asset" was obtained by joint 
sacrifices. Not wanting to call the asset which was the return 
from this investment "property" because of the definitional 
problems set forth in many of the cases where the courts had 
attempted to deal with the asset as classical property, the court 
28 
has essentially created a group of assets or "pseudo-property" 
which can be allocated in order to further the requirements of 
justice in cases involving investments in human capital. While 
the concept is revolutionary, it does provide a logical 
foundation for dealing with the allocation of intangible assets 
and is clearly consistent with this court's approach to 
allocating retirement benefits which accrued during a marriage 
as set forth Woodward and Englert. In both retirement and Human 
Capital cases the asset is very intangible in nature, cannot be 
sold or traded, and is vested in the benefitted party (i.e. the 
party whose contribution to the marital partnership was from 
employment outside the home). Both assets require valuation of a 
future flow of income which may or may not actually take place 
depending on the longevity of the vested or benefitted party. 
And, in some cases, realization of the asset requires the 
continued labor of the vested or benefitted party. As the 
Gardner court states, concerning retirement benefits, "Regardless 
of how remote the full value of an asset is, it still has a 
present value . . . ." Citing Englert, supra, 576 P.2d 1274 
(Utah 1978), the court reiterated that martial property 
"encompasses all assets of every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." Gardner, 
supra, at 1078 - 1079. 
The allocation of these intangible retirement benefits has 
been so widely accepted within the country that they are codified 
in federal legislation such as the Uniformed Services Former 
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Spouses Protection Act (PL 97-252), the Retirement Equity Act of 
1984 (PL 98-397), and the Civil Service Retirement Spouse Equity 
Act of 1984 (PL 98-615). 
As is the case with the allocation of retirement benefits 
under Woodward and the cases which followed, in the event that 
the future stream of income is considered to be too speculative 
by the court, or if there are insufficient tangible property 
assets which have been acquired during the marriage to make an 
equitable offset in such property for the contributing spouse, 
then the court has the power to require the allocation of the 
asset from the vested or benefitted spouse to the contributing 
spouse at the time that the income is actually received. To 
require similar payments under the concept of equitable 
restitution clearly would be as equitably justified as requiring 
the division retirement benefits as they are received. 
While the concept of equitable restitution is more clearly 
necessary to achieve equity in a case such as this where only 
minimal tangible real and personal property has been acquired by 
the parties, and thus are not available to offset for the value 
of the human capital acquisition, the concept can be applied to 
any case where the parties have invested in this intangible 
asset. If the human capital asset is a major acquisition during 
the marriage, then the equitable allocation set forth under the 
concept of equitable restitution can take place in tandem with 
the allocation of other, more tangible assets acquired during the 
marriage. Or, if the court feels that there are adequate 
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tangible assets to offset the value of the human capital 
investment as was the case in Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P. 2d 1308 (Utah 
1982), Gardner, supra, and similar cases where the parties had 
enjoyed the fruits of the medical education for many years prior 
to the dissolution proceedings, then a complete offset could be 
worked out in conjunction with appropriate valuations. 
Although the Court of Appeals realizes that the asset which 
allows a party to take part in the medical profession is a 
treasure which is located in the brain of the benefitted party, 
the court has not been led down the primrose path with claims 
that we would be killing the goose that laid the golden egg if we 
attempt to apportion the asset. All we have to do is remain 
patient and allocate the golden eggs between the parties as they 
are laid. If the goose stops delivering for any reason, then 
neither party receives any eggs. Since the Court of Appeals has 
had the courage to take the pioneering step, and realizing that 
pioneering advances often require some polish or modification 
during their evolution, plaintiff petitions this court to sustain 
that pioneering effort and to perhaps further clarify the method 
of allocation pioneered by the Court of Appeals. 
POINT III 
IN ORDER TO DEAL EQUITABLY WITH THE ALLOCATION OF INTANGIBLE 
MARITAL ASSETS THE COURT MAY NEED TO REORDER THE SEQUENCE IN 
WHICH DIVORCE ISSUES ARE RESOLVED. 
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After reviewing the cases throughout the country which have 
attempted to deal with the thorny issue before this court, 
plaintiff believes that some of the problems related to achieving 
an equitable solution in these matters have arisen as a result of 
the sequence in which the marital dissolutions have been resolved 
by the various courts. By attempting to deal with classic 
alimony analysis, and perhaps dealing with the child support 
analysis prior to deciding the thornier issue addressed by the 
concept of equitable restitution, the courts have placed 
themselves in positions from which achieving equity under the 
circumstances of the particular case are more difficult, and the 
results often distorted. As a result of the problems observed in 
those cases, plaintiff would further suggest to the court the 
following approach to dealing with cases in which human capital 
and other intangible assets are applicable. 
A. ALLOCATE THE INTANGIBLE ASSET: 
1. By making this the first step in the process, 
rather than the second or third, the court will be able to 
allocate the intangible asset without the overriding concerns of 
amounts previously allocated to alimony, or the inequity of the 
alimony awarded to the contributing spouse terminating upon his 
or her remarriage. The calculation would be made in the manner 
similar to that performed by plaintiff's experts at the trial 
during May, 1985. In order to net out the ongoing "work" factor, 
and to isolate the human capital asset, the base line (pre-
investment) income figure would be subtracted from the total 
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post-investment income figure. In the present case, plaintiff's 
experts utilized the average income of a high school graduate who 
was a contemporary of defendant or $33,600 per year. 
Deducting the pre-investment income from the post-investment 
gross income (which by definition would exclude "costs of 
business11 which were $7,100 per year at trial) would leave an 
annual income attributable to the investment of $59,300.00. 
($100,000 less $7,100 = $92,900 less $33,600 = $59,300.) 
Plaintiff's half (since all investment occurred during the 
marriage) of the return on the investment would be $29,650 per 
year or 32.25% of the gross income after required business 
expenses. The award of equitable restitution to plaintiff could 
then be defined as 32.25% of defendant's gross income after 
business expenses, with plaintiff responsible for the taxes on 
what she received. To facilitate annual changes in income, 
payments could be made monthly, based upon the prior year's 
income data, with a one-time adjustment at the end of the year to 
correct for any current year changes. Reducing the amount which 
plaintiff received to a fixed percentage of the gross income 
would reduce inequities which might be brought about by future 
decreases or increases in defendant's income, and would eliminate 
the need for frequent adjustments to the equitable restitution 
formula in order to keep the allocations of return on the 
investment equal. The New York appeals court used this approach 
in its 1988 decision in Maloney v Maloney, 524 N.Y.S.2d 758 at 
760 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1988) where they held that a professional 
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license is marital property and that the contributing spouse was 
entitled, under the facts, to 35% of the value of the license 
(reduced from 50% because of other factors). Thirty-five percent 
was $456,632. The New York court based the precent on the 
present value at the time of trial. Plaintiff's proposal here is 
more fair because of the deductions before the division and 
because the award depends on actual income since it would adjust 
yearly. 
2. As shown above, the costs of doing business 
associated with the post-investment flow of income, such as 
malpractice insurance or other actual costs of doing business 
incurred by the benefitted spouse should be netted out. In this 
particular case, defendant's testimony at trial was that his 
professional expenditures for dues, malpractice insurance and 
other related required professional expenditures were $7,100.00 
per year. 
3. As referred to earlier, any necessary debt service 
or debts associated with the investment should be shared equally 
from the post-investment income flow as would be the case if the 
parties had stayed together and were required to pay off the 
loans from the income as it was earned. In his exhibit at trial, 
defendant claimed that his monthly payments for such loans were 
$208 per month or $2,496 per year. (Defendant's exhibits 3, R 
122.) 
4. Once each party had been awarded his or her share 
of the investment proceeds, then the income attributable to their 
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labor factors should be added to that share. In the present 
case, plaintifffs annual income at the time of trial was 
$10,152, although she testified that she had just become a three-
fourth time employee and moved to a different job did not know 
how much less she would earn. (TT 58, 17-25.) In the case of 
defendant, he would be awarded the entire base line income for 
the high school graduate of $33,600 along with his share of that 
portion of the current income attributed to return on the 
investment. 
5. After the total income figures had been determined 
under paragraph 4 above, then the court would address whether or 
not there was a need for alimony under the circumstances as they 
existed after that first allocation. This would allow the court 
to equalize the standards of living where there was a 
particularly lopsided allocation of income such as in the current 
case where we have attributed $33,600 to defendants "work 
income", while plaintiff's earnings amounted to only $10,152. 
Under such circumstances the court might well find that some 
transfer of income in the form of alimony, which would terminate 
upon remarriage of the lower income contributing spouse, might 
well be in order. Under circumstances where the resultant 
incomes were closely matched after the adjustment, then clearly 
alimony would not be appropriate to either party. 
6. After distribution of the human capital asset and 
the alimony determination, the burden of supporting the parties1 
children would then be calculated based upon the total combined 
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incomes of the parties, with the relative contributions of the 
parties being based upon their total disposable incomes after the 
allocation of the portion of the earnings attributable to the 
human capital investment and any alimony payments. In other 
words, in this case defendant would not pay child support based 
on the total $100,000 per year or $8,333 per month income, but 
would pay his child support essentially on the basis of $63,250 
(the $33,600 he would earn as a high school graduate plus 
$29,650, his one-half of the return on the investment) the 
disposable income remaining after allocating to plaintiff her 
share of the investment proceeds, less any alimony payments 
awarded to plaintiff. Although at the time of the trial one of 
the children was living with defendant, plaintiff acknowledges 
that the son Ryan is now living with defendant, and has lived 
with defendant since shortly after the trial in May, 1985. As a 
result, an offset would be determined from the amount of child 
support payable from defendant to plaintiff utilizing procedures 
recommended by the Child Support Task Force for split-custody 
situations. 
7. After making these allocations, the court could 
then undertake the relative easier task of allocating the 
tangible real and personal property which was accumulated during 
the marriage. In this case, with the exception of the equity in 
the house, the parties stipulated at trial, without prejudice as 
to plaintiff's claim for a portion of the human capital asset, 
that they would each keep the personal property which they had at 
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the time of trial. Under such circumstances, plaintiff would 
expect that defendant would receive a lien for one-half of the 
stipulated equity in the parties' home, with that equity payable 
upon the first to occur of the normal lien payment triggers 
namely plaintiff1s remarriage or cohabitation, the sale of the 
home, or the youngest child living in the home attaining the age 
of majority (which was found to be age 21 for support purposes by 
the trial court). (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
paragraph 14, R 206.) 
POINT IV 
IN THE INTEREST OF EQUITY, THIS COURT SHOULD DIRECT THAT THE 
FINAL REMEDY FASHIONED ON APPEAL TO CORRECT THE HARSHLY 
INEQUITABLE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD 
BE MADE RETROACTIVE TO MAY 31, 1985, THE DAY OF TRIAL. 
At the trial, both parties had ample opportunity to present 
testimony as to the valuation of the human capital asset. 
Defendant knew from the time that the amended complaint was filed 
that plaintiff claimed an entitlement to a portion of the 
proceeds realized on what the experts described was the human 
capital investment during the marriage. Defendant elected not to 
present expert testimony, and was unsuccessful in attempting to 
undermine the credibility of the witnesses during cross-
examination. Based upon that complete record, the Court of 
Appeals had no difficulty in ordering an amendment of the decree 
of divorce as it related to the child support and alimony 
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figures, and the allocation of income tax exemptions arising out 
of the parties1 children. 
Within the analysis of the facts and equities of the case as 
set forth under Point III above, it is clear that the evidence 
necessary to make the allocation of plaintiff's share of the 
investment in human capital is clearly in the record, and an 
order can be entered by this court as to the allocation which 
should have been made by the trial court based upon the evidence 
presented at the hearing on May 31, 19B5. In order to rectify 
the harsh inequity imposed upon plaintiff by the trial court, the 
ultimate ruling by this court regarding the allocation of that 
asset, and any adjustments to alimony and child support which 
ultimately survive the final adjustment by this court should be 
made retroactive to the date upon which the evidence was 
presented to the court. 
POINT V 
P L A I N T I F F HAS CLEARLY CARRIED A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN OF 
B R I N G I N G ABOUT A NECESSARY CHANGE IN THE LAW OF THIS 
JURISDICTION IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE INEQUITIES IMPOSED UPON HER 
BY THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD THUS BE AWARDED A SUBSTANTIAL 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE SIGNIFICANT COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
INCURRED THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE PROCESS. 
At t h e t i m e o f t r i a l p l a i n t i f f p r o v i d e d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
t e s t i m o n y a n d e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p o r t h e r c l a i m f o r 
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attorney's fees in conjunction with the stipulation by defendant 
that the attorney's fees reflected on plaintiff's exhibit I, R 
122 were reasonable and reflected the labor and cost invested in 
the case up to that time. The trial court refused to award 
attorney's fees commensurate with that effort, and essentially 
limited the fee awarded to her to that which had been charged to 
defendant by his counsel. The exhibit clearly reflects that the 
efforts of plaintiff's counsel were far in excess of those 
provided by defendant's counsel, including an extensively 
researched trial brief which formed the initial foundation for 
the appeal to this court and the Court of Appeals. Failure to 
provide plaintiff with reimbursement for the costs and fees 
incurred will further reduce what plaintiff actually receives as 
her equitable share of the marital investment represented by the 
defendant's medical degree, license and ultimately his medical 
specialization. In addition, plaintiff should be awarded 
attorney's fees and costs in connection with the entire appeals 
process. Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978 at 982 (Utah App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION 
In fashioning its award of Equitable Restitution, the Utah 
Court of Appeals recognized and took a courageous pioneering step 
toward correcting a long standing inequity in allocating 
intangible marital assets acquired as a result of clearly 
recognizable investment behavior. The fact that this investment 
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is in human capital and vests in the brain of the benefitted 
spouse does not dilute the sacrifices and contributions made in 
support of that investment by the contributing spouse, who, 
unfortunately, does not receive an allocation of the improved 
brain power at the conclusion of the investment process. Her 
"allocation" would have taken the form of a wife!s share of the 
greatly increased future income and the resultant standard of 
living. To deny her the share of this investment which she 
otherwise would have had without the divorce, which was found to 
be the fault of the party who stands to gain her fair share of 
the return, would not serve fairness or equity. To deny her that 
share because of some technical definitional problems with the 
concept of "property," as argued by defendant, would be to 
discard the concept of equity by placing form over substance. 
Plaintiff made the sacrifices, paid the price, and in fairness 
should receive her share of the proceeds without penalizing her 
for the extended time required by the appellate process. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ H *** day of February, 1989. 
HANSEN & CRIST 
i 
Neil B. Crist I 
Nelda M. Bishop 
Attorneys for plaintiff/ 
respondent 
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